



THE POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY AND THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF 
PUBLIC REGULATION. AN APROPOS ON THE ULTIMATE CAUSE OF 
THE CURRENT CRISIS 
 




In this paper we will briefly comment on the political philosophy (that is, 
considering the relationship among various types of normative judgments – as 
those of moral, ethic, legal nature) and on the political economy (that is a critique 
of  interventionist  policies,  in  a  means-ends  dialectics)  of  the  regulatory  setup 
orchestrated by public authorities. We will analyze them given their particular 
nature (State-made endeavors, where the State is the social apparatus of legal, 
but  not  necessarily  rightful,  coercion  and  compulsion),  and  emphasizing  the 
necessary  qualitative  outcomes  derived  from  their  very  nature;  and,  finally, 
providing  a  possible  way  of  rethinking  the  regulation-driven  or  deregulation-
driven crisis dilemma. 
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The stake of the “de/re/regulation debate” 
 
The economists’ guild is divided, among other issues regarding the current 
crisis, also on the theme of the nature and impact of the regulatory mainframe, 
preceding the current downturn, on the emergence of the whole turmoil. What for 
some  was  the  “fire-starter”,  for  others  was  the  only  “extinction/prevention” 
imaginable (insufficient as it was, since the crisis finally started). If for some the 
deregulation preceding the current crisis (like abolition, at the beginning of the 
80’s, of Regulation Q from Glass-Steagall Act (1933), which aimed at controlling 
interest rates; the accomplishment of cancelling Glass-Steagall Act in 1999 by 
removing  the  interdiction  to  combine  commercial  banking  and  investment 
banking activities etc.) unleashed the so-called “irrational forces of the market”, 
launching them in a unsustainable speculations in the real estate and financial 
territory, for others it was quite the regulatory residuals (the statist management in 
the sphere of money and banking or pieces of legislation, such as Community 
Reinvestment Act from 1977, giving disadvantaged categories of people access to 
owning houses, despite prudent credit principles) that created the premises for the 
2008 wreck. In this paper, we will briefly comment on the political philosophy 
(that is, considering the relationship among various types of normative judgments 
– as those of moral, ethic, legal nature) and on the political economy (that is a 
critique of interventionist policies, in a means-ends dialectics) of the regulatory 
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setup orchestrated by public authorities, given their particular nature (State-made 
endeavors, where the State is the social apparatus of legal, but not necessarily 
rightful,  coercion  and  compulsion),  and  emphasizing  the  necessary  qualitative 
outcomes derived from their very nature, and, finally providing a possible way of 
thinking the regulation-driven or deregulation-driven crisis dilemma. 
An indisputable fact is that the economic reality standing before us is, as 
Ludwig von Mises would say, complex – the result of some various factors with 
antagonistic influences. This thing also has consequences in the debate area (even 
in genuine, honest debates; all the more when demagogy intervenes), because the 
actors - as far as historical facts are taken as referential – can virtually endlessly 
immunize their arguments and positions. In such wise, regulation supporters can 
state, regardless of how much regulation there already is, that there isn’t enough, 
or that there isn’t quite the best formula (and regardless of the little deregulation 
produces, it is enough to be blamed for all the problems); and vice versa for 
deregulation supporters. There is a way out of this (merely political) deadlock, 
and that is the return to a theoretical debate. In social sciences we are condemned 
to not even understand the daily phenomena if we don’t already operate (whether 
we realize it or not) with a theory, be it derived from political philosophy or 
political economy. In this manner, the dialogue can continue if the debating parts 
raise their eyes from the facts and resume to theoretical debate, explaining how, in 
principle and in general, the crisis results from deregulation (statists) or, on the 
contrary, from Government intervention (liberals). To the extent that those two 
theories claim contradictory things, they cannot be both right at the same time, at 
least  for  those  still  operating  with  the  classic  and,  by  the  way,  “natural” 
Aristotelian logic. 
 
A political philosophy view on regulations 
This  paper  starts  from  the  faith  and  conviction  that  the  intellectual 
adventured in the social sciences who is not supported by a logically consistent 
and naturally realistic (political) “philosophy”, a logically consistent and naturally 
realistic “ethics”, will enter “unarmed” the arena of scientific knowledge, while he 
will  enter,  if  interested,  the  political  arena  with  an  entire  “rack”  of  vicious 
judgments. The regulation/deregulation discussion is a hypostasis of a broader 
debate  on  the  need  to  maintain  under  strict  control  the  human  behavior, 
eventually by legally keeping it away from immoral territory. The current crisis 
was explained also as a slippage toward immoral habits – greed, carelessness, 
moral  hazard  opportunism,  besides…  rough  stupidity,  incompetence  and 
ignorance. Consequently, the advocates of regulations state that these propensities 
have to be tamed by… law. 
The main theoretical problem is raised: deregulation/under regulation in 
relation to what? To talk about “deregulation” or “under regulation” implies to 
subsidiary accept a main standard regarding regulation, a problem that takes us at 
the heart of law theory. This isn’t the place to expand the main debate with respect 
to this problem (natural law versus positive law), but Hayek’s (1973) or Leoni’s  
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(1991[1961]) observation suggests itself, observation according to which, when 
developed without founding criteria/principles, “the law” perverts itself, becoming 
arbitrary and discretionary “legislation”. From tool of general interests it becomes 
one of special interests and rent-seeking pursued with public policy tools (which 
could turn out to be extremely efficient in this view). So, from the perspective of 
political  philosophy  looking  for  a  “standard”  in  order  to  judge  regulations 
becomes crucial. 
First  of  all,  we  will  distinguish  between  ethics  and  morality,  in  other 
words, between justice and virtue. We will name ethical behaviour “the limited 
meaning of justice” – “don’t take the other’s right” –, meaning non-aggression 
and the “sacred” respect of private property, and moral or virtuous behaviour “the 
comprehensive meaning of justice”, respectively – “work all virtue”. When saying 
virtue we will choose the meaning attached to it in the Christian tradition, pointing 
that, without any other further inquiry in “comparative moral religious systems”, 
there  is  an  evident  common  denominator  in  moral  traditions  across  cultures, 
isolating  a  common  core  of  virtues.  We  will  summarize  the  announced  two 
investigative levels connected by a… logical relations: the ethical level and the 
moral level.  
Just/ethical level: The ethics of liberty and private property succeeds to 
give a rational answer to the question “when is physical violence allowed from a 
social point of view? (Not advisable! Forgiveness still exists.)”. The answer is: 
only  for  legitimate  defence  of  the  person  or  the  property  against  physical 
aggression,  or  for  the  purpose  of  obtaining  due  remedies  further  to  such 
aggression, and only from the aggressor, and only for the victim or their agents. 
The ethics of non-aggression, freedom and property is the only ethical position 
which may be universalized and which is non-contradictory when applied.  The 
importance of this level is that it is/should be the critical etalon in laws/legislation 
making. 
Moral  level:  The  actions  are  here  divided  into  moral  (virtuous)  and 
immoral (vicious; non-virtuous). The essential dissimilarity with ethical conduct 
occurs  due  to  the  fact  that  the  moral  level  supposes  some  virtually  unlimited 
means to work virtue (defined from the religion or philosophy point of view, in 
accordance  with  a  personal  Weltanschauung  as  assumed  or  accepted  by  the 
community), possibilities that go from the minimum threshold assigned by the 
ethical level (do not transgress your fellow’s freedom and legal area – in other 
words, the legitimate private property) up to the maximum limit of self-sacrifice 
for the other’s sake. Immorality includes in-ethics, but is more comprehensive. 
The differential between non-virtue and aggression may be strictly sanctioned by 
non-aggressive  opprobrium  (e.g.,  the  greed,  the  carelessness,  the  selfishness 
manifested within the strict limits of the property of the immoral person deserves 
no more than “blame & shame”.) 
So, given the unlimited nature of virtue, of the moral facts in the most 
comprehensive  meaning,  to  include  some  moral  elements  at  the  ethical  level 
would be equivalent to giving a blank check to those invoking the said principle  
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on  all  those  they  had  in  view  as  not  enough  virtuous  and  “therefore”  legally 
punishable. If the entire virtue becomes duty (to be extracted even by force if 
necessary) towards third parties, it may reasonably bring the question of claiming 
the  supreme  sacrifice  of  someone  for  our  sake.  To  generalize  this  possibility 
results  in  unimaginable  consequences  for  the  right  order  (which  would  be 
anything but order). As – like a world in which the presumption of guilt would be 
valid instead of the presumption of innocence – everybody would be permanently 
guilty.  Because  who  would  pass  and  elude  brilliantly  the  test  of  having  done 
“everything” under a given circumstance? 
Therefore, does it make any sense to pretend to regulate greed in order to 
avoid crisis, or, rather, the only thing that should be tackled by a sound law is the 
aggression against someone’s person or property. And, if the State is naturally 
associate  with  this  kind  of  invasive  behavior,  wouldn’t  be  the  case  to  simply 
outlaw  this  behavior,  and  reframe  its  actions  solely  to  securing  lives  and 
properties  of  individuals  without  harming  anyone,  that  is  by  deregulating  – 
otherwise put, from abolishing aggressive institutions and policies? 
 
A political economy review on regulations 
Moreover, when the law tends to go beyond what is strictly necessary to 
ensure  the  integrity  of  the  non-aggressors’  property,  it  places  itself  in  a  truly 
calculation chaos. Because, for instance, what is the main limit of the interest or 
exchange rate, or of the proper balance between equity and debt in banking? Etc. 
Any regulation with respect to features that have entrepreneurial character (that 
refer to particular future circumstances of place, time, and persons) is clueless, 
committing legislation to coordinates which at a particular time seem adequate, 
only to later become stale (moment at which the Government clearly produces 
“public bads”, let alone public goods). And particularly because of that, in its 
classical meaning, the law was considered to address general aspects of human 
interaction and not factual, particular (and absurd) ones (i.e.: houses have to be 
red; carrots have to cost 2 euro/kilo, etc.). 
Another problem that corrupts the correct reference to deregulation stems 
from  the  classical  problem  of  interventionism  instability.  Briefly,  this  theory 
asserts that state intervention in the economy – considering economy to be in itself 
a system and an interconnected structure – can never be just punctual, targeted 
and  strictly  limited,  but  will  inevitably  put  the  authority  in  front  of  the 
unavoidable effects on adjacent sectors to those where intervention took place, 
effects that have to be “solved” by new interventions (gradually accumulating 
interventions) or by removing the previous interventions that generated them. If 
the first approach is pursued, the interventionist economy in question is gradually 
heading toward socialism (the system of “comprehensive intervention”); if the 
second approached is embraced, then it is heading towards a more purely free 
market system (Mises 1998a, Chapter 3). 
This being said, if at a certain time a bundle of interventions are designed 
to consolidate each other in a certain state of stability (apparently, at least) and  
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one of them, by “deregulation”, is dropped out, it is very likely that the situation 
will become, at least at the superficial level of perception, if not also substantially, 
even more unstable. But it is here that the problem arises: if interventions make a 
system, and a few of them are eliminated and instability is obtained, it may seem 
from  this  that  re-regulation  is  in  order  (or  re-intervention  when  this  was 
eliminated).  But  also  this  situation  may  suggest  –  or  necessarily  does  –  that 
deregulation  hasn’t  gone  far  enough  to  eliminate  the  whole  bundle  of 
interventionist instruments.   
At the end of these observations, we want to make a reminder that the free 
market is fully equipped to handle “the production of regulation”, a production 
incomparably more dynamic, more flexible and well adapted to entrepreneurial 
(and not only) needs than the statist/governmental one. Private commercial law, 
together with commercial and business practices, has its origins somewhere in the 
international  trading  activity  of  medieval  merchants.  Furthermore,  private 
arbitration  is  currently  considered  the  most  effective  method  (without  anyone 
doubting its correctness) to solve disputes, the public judicial courts way being 
recognized as a quasi-dead end. It’s worth concluding for now, we think, with 
this: from a liberal perspective, perhaps the best thing the state could do would be 
to make way for private supervisory and regulatory institutions. As for morality, 
the  economics  of  voluntary  social  /  communitarian  inclusion  or  exclusion 
provides the best law. 
 
The (de)regulation and the subprime crisis 
A proven fact though is that an economic crisis is also an intellectual crisis 
in the economists tribe. Three characteristics interest us such phenomena: they 
come from somewhere (are recurrent), appear in the industry of financial assets 
(for example real estate) and sit on clusters of errors (not just a bank or developer 
that fails, but clusters of them). A non-mystical explanation though exists. Ludwig 
von Mises and Friedrich Hayek found it a long time ago: this is the… regulated 
expansion of credit. 
The reasoning is simple enough: this expansion is made possible precisely 
by the organization/operation of the regulated modern banking system (fractional 
reserves,  central  banking,  and  fiat  money).  It  has  a  complex  source:  first,  the 
production (and hence the expansion) of fiat money is made by the central bank 
(the State monopoly of monetary production), which creates the framework by 
setting  the  volume  of  “reserves”  in  the  system;  then,  through  the  fractional 
reserves system, banks take part in the expansion, becoming – within the limits 
prescribed by the rules of minimum reserve requirements (RRs) – co-creators of 
money along with central bank (the so-called mechanism of the multiplication of 
credit). (The basic feature in modern banking is no longer the non-coverage of 
demand deposits with reserves, but the elimination of any distinction between 
demand  and  term  deposits,  which  makes  virtually  all  bank  deposits  de  facto 
demand deposits.)  
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It was Mises (1953) who realized that the production of additional money 
through the modern banking system does not stay at the level of simple inflation 
(generating only uneven price increases and redistribution), but also affects credit 
and  the  interest  rate,  and  altogether  produces  changes  in  the  inter-temporal 
structure of production. And that because the new money first enters in the form 
of credit in the banking system, influencing (lowering) interest rates, without this 
being “taken into consideration” in the rest of the production structure. Therefore 
there is a mismatch/incompatibility between the interest rate (which decreases) 
and the rest of prices structure (which for the moment remain unchanged). Of 
course this incompatibility occurs only if the credit expansion is not anticipated; if 
it is, then the interest rate does not decrease, being adjusted with the anticipated 
inflation.  
So,  if  there  is  unanticipated  expansion  of  credit  in  the  system  (the 
cumulative result of pumping reserves into the system by the central bank and of 
multiplying credit through the fractional reserve mechanism), the interest rate will 
tend to fall below what it would have otherwise been, which is misleading for 
entrepreneurs. They, perceiving a relief regarding the access to capital, will launch 
themselves  into  more  ambitious  investment  projects  (“longer”,  more  capital 
“intensive”), relying on the illusory existence of higher real savings, consistent 
with  the  new  vision  (more  optimistic)  on  the  inter-temporal  structure  of 
production.  Things  go  apparently  great  until  the  entrepreneurs  and  employees 
from the area of these new initiated investment projects “meet” at the market with 
the people wishing to exercise their present consumption at levels consistent with 
prior interest rate, because the structure of preferences has not changed. This was 
only falsely suggested by the artificial expansion of credit. This “clash” begins to 
occur immediately, but becomes obvious only gradually, its main symptom being 
prices’ increase. This immediately raises problems for entrepreneurs who have 
initiated “longer” projects which, in light of the new prices, no longer seem so 
profitable. (In the light of the new prices, interest rates also tend to be corrected 
back upward).  
Thus  a  turning  point  is  reached:  either  credit  expansion  ceases  and 
unsustainable  projects  are  liquidated  –  liquidation  matching  the  expansion  in 
importance;  or,  still  confident  in  its  own  money  management  capabilities,  the 
central bank facilitates again, implicitly even more, the lending conditions through 
a  new  round  of  credit  expansion.  The  cycle  repeats:  back  into  the  seemingly 
profitable projects and perhaps even new ones will be initiated. Once again the 
investment atmosphere is an optimistic one, and the interest rate is lower than it 
would have been otherwise. To the extent that not even now people’s preferences 
for consumption versus saving/investing have not changed, the meeting between 
the recipients of new money resources and the rest of the population puts again 
upward  pressure  on  prices  (and  interest).  (The  subprime  crisis  of  2007  is  the 
daughter of the one exploding in 2000 that marked the ending of the dot.com 
bubble economy on US stock exchanges. And that one is related to a previous 
boom in mid-90s and, recurrently, so on and so forth…).  
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In order to avoid the deflationary consequences of the 2000 bust plus the 
“9.11”, the Fed decided to sponsor a suite of interest rate reductions, to less than 
1% (in the summer of 2003). M.O. – classic, by crediting the mandatory reserve 
accounts kept by commercials banks in the Federal Reserve System. On these new 
reserves, banks created new deposits, on which more borrowing could be made to 
the mathematical limit of the credit multiplier. The increase in credit availability 
reduced  both  the  interest  rate  and  banks’  prudence.  And  the  banks,  naturally 
looking to maximize profits by using all available resources, opened their gates to 
clients with a credit history and rating ridiculously low. In 2004, the Fed started to 
fear  the  inflationary  effects  of  its  cheap  money  policy  and  slowly  raised  the 
interest rate, in order to reduce the propensity for credit expansion. The volume of 
credit entering real estate was drastically reduced, house prices fell, and multiple 
underperforming mortgages started to pressure on banks’ liquidity. Banks, in turn, 
not only stopped lending but went looking on the inter-bank market for money to 
plug  their  balance  sheets.  But  the  subprime  crisis  did  not  appear  because  the 
reference interest rate rose with almost 4 pps in from 2003 to 2007. That’s why it 
happened  earlier.  (Memento:  on  the  free  market,  the  deposit  interest  rate  is 
determined only by the time preferences – saving vs. consumption – of all market 
actors.  If  it  decreases  by  fiat  rather  than  because  an  increase  in  saving,  the 
investors, who cannot see the trick behind the number, enter large investment 
projects, time-consuming as well, that beforehand were downright unprofitable. 
Investors should now some economics too, and figure out what the central bank is 
doing to sift good from bad in the interest rate. Banks should also not speculate on 
a large scale this lack of precaution – and form the above mentioned clusters of 
failure. (The central bank should also not let commercial banks err in their ways, 
though without sapping the purpose of the banking system with excess regulation, 
on top of the existing one.) 
The increase in the reference rate only hurries the inevitable disclosure of 
errors. The guilty party is thus Greenspan the Expansionist of 2001 rather than 
Greenspan the Anti-Inflationist of 2004. And, by any standard, a monetary policy 
prompted  over  a  fractional  reserve  banking  system  is  not  an  offshoot  of  free 
market,  but  one  of  pure  regulations.  And,  moreover,  it  was  something  that 
channelled the fake monetary affluence to the most unfortunate debouche: the 
Community  Reinvestment  Act,  fighting  discrimination  and  supporting  social 
inclusion by means of easier credit to members of poorer suburban communities. 
(As a funny coincidence, a CRA rating is required for the approval of mergers and 
acquisitions in the banking system.) The perverted behaviour could be logically 
linked with unwise regulations, not with the lack of regulations, having in mind 
that the free market, based on the sacred respect for person and property, is by its 
very  nature,  inclined  to  born  the  just  amount  of  business  regulations,  without 
confusing  puritan  morality  or  hard-core  democracy  with  natural  and  rational 





Conclusions (and a common-sense advice) 
The crisis tend to be rather associated with certain behaviours nourished 
by  certain  regulations  (in  central  and  commercial  banking  or  in  welfare 
entitlements  territory),  than  with  pure  (free)  market  excesses.  They  have  in 
common the departure from the standard of natural rights that should be protected 
in society (even by the State). When public authorities tend to exceed the limit of 
regulating, they invariably do it for the benefit of some and at the expense of 
others. This creates incentives for opportunistic behaviours, be they unethical or 
immoral.  Their  consequences,  given  their  unsound  and  unsustainable  premises 
(which conflict with the very law of scarcity, the censor for any societal project 
aiming at non-conflict and efficiency) are dramatic, and the corrections necessary 
are as painful as necessary. In the above logic, the only thing a government should 




Butler,  Eamon.  (2009).  The  financial  crisis:  blame  governments,  not  bankers, 
chapter  (4).  In  Booth,  Philip  (ed.),  Verdict  on  the  Crash:  Causes  and 
Policy Implications. Institute of Economic Affairs. London. 
Dăianu,  D.  (2009).  Capitalismul  încotro?  Criza  economică,  mersul  ideilor, 
instituţii. Iaşi: Polirom. 
Hayek,  Fr.  A.  (1973).  Law,  Legislation  and  Liberty:  A  New  Statement  of  the 
Liberal  Principles  of  Justice  and  Political  Economy  (vol.  I,  Rules  and 
Order). Routledge & Kegan Paul Ltd. 
Hülsmann.,  J.  G.  (1998).  Toward  a  General  Theory  of  Error  Cycles.  The 
Quarterly Journal of Austrian Economics 1(4) [Winter 1998]. 
Jora, O.-D. (2009). Trei teorii liberale ale proprietăţii şi fundamentele analizei 
economice  în  termeni  de  proprietate  (IV  –  Analiza  contrafactuală  a 
aproprierii), ŒCONOMICA, an. XVIII, nr. 4. 
Leoni, B. (1991[1961]). Freedom and the Law. Indianapolis: Liberty Fund. 
Mises,  L.  von  (1990).  Money,  Method,  and  the  Market  Process  (ed.  and 
introduction by Richard E. Ebeling). Auburn, Alabama: The Ludwig von 
Mises Institute; Norwell, Mass.: Kluwer Academic Publishers. 
Mises, L. von (1998a), Capitalismul şi duşmanii săi. Bucureşti: Editura Nemira. 
Mises, L. von (1998b), Human Action. A Treatise on Economics (The Scholar’s 
Edition). Auburn, Alabama: The Ludwig von Mises Institute. 
Mises, L. von. (1953 [1912]). Theory of Money and Credit. New Haven: Yale 
University Press. 
Rothbard, M. N. (1996). Economic Depressions: Their Cause and Cure. In 
Ebeling, Richard (ed.), The Austrian Theory of the Trade Cycle and 
Other Essays. 
Rothbard, M. N. (2000 [1963]). America’s Great Depression. Auburn, Alabama: 
The Ludwig von Mises Institute.  
 
31 
Rothbard, Murray Newton (1998) The Ethics of Liberty. New York and London: 
New York: University Press. 
Rothbard, Murray Newton (2002a) For a New Liberty. The Libertarian Manifesto. 
New York: Collier Books, a Division of Macmillan Publishing Co., Inc. 
Tatiana Moşteanu, Mihaela Iacob (2010), Criteriul Pareto şi cazul principial 
al “statului creator de bunuri publice”. ŒCONOMICA, an. XIX, nr. 
1. 
Topan,  Mihai-Vladimir  (2009)  Întreprinderea  în  afacerile  internaţionale.  O 
abordare din perspectiva şcolii austriece, Teză de doctorat. 
   